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Abstract
In this article we are dealing with the connections between nowadays
most dynamically improving automatic identification-related RFID technol-
ogy and cryptographic algorithms. You are going to be introduced to the
possibility of attacks against RFID systems and the ways to defeat them. We
are also dwelling on the suitable and non-suitable cryptographic algorithms
among the well known and frequently used ones. The type of the RFID tag
highly influences the group of the suitable algorithms. The size of the tag’s
integrated memory matters a lot, as well as the fact that it uses its own
intelligence or we are working with a cheap passive tag.
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1. Introduction
Nowadays widespread forms of identification systems are in use. It means such
code- and communication systems which identify people and objects uniquely.
The most dynamically improving state-of-the-art identification system is the RFID
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(radio-frequency identification), using more channels in the electromagnetic fre-
quency interval between 125KHz and 2.4GHz to carry out its functions. We can
expand the basic frequency to the 2.4–5.8GHz range. This range is called SHF.
The reading distance here is above 3m.
Paired with different types of sensors or location systems it can be used in many
fields. This technology is employed in motor vehicle production, logistics, pharma-
ceutical and army technology, and in a lot of other areas. Modern passports, digital
identifiers, and the newest ways of payment all take advantage of its identification
and security opportunities. [12, 13]
2. The RFID Systems and the direction of their de-
velopment
In this section we will be presenting the part of RFID focused on the transponders
and readers. Because they are exposed to attacks.
The RFID has a great advantage over the bar code systems, that it does not
require a direct view of the reading. When we want to read the barcode, we need
to catch all products, on witch there is label or vignette. It is a very slow task and
it requires a lot of human resources. Therefore it is expensive. At the same time we
can read a lot of transponders. If we have due RFID reader with a well positioned
special antenna, we can realize long-distance reading too. Storage capacity depends
on the integrated chip’s capacity. It can range from a couple of dozen bytes to a
few megabytes.
The RFID system can be partitioned to isolated sections of equipments. These
are the transponders, named tags, readers with transmitting and receiver aerials,
middle-ware, database and the user applications. The user application can be
developed to smart-phones, to tablets and to PCs. The primary targets for attacks
are the tags, which store the identification and descriptive data. The readers and
aerials are the other side of electro-magnetic communication. The readers can be
attacked with software tools. If the attack is successful, through the software of
the middleware the database can be infected. In this case the danger escalates,
because all information can be lost or worse, if it falls into the wrong hands.
2.1. Passive tags
The passive tags are low-cost and can store large quantities of data. They do not
have an active transmitter, so they can not radiate data independently. They use
the radiated energy from the reader. They collect the energy out of the reader wave
and with own aerials send back the modulated wave to the reader. The aerials must
be well set and tuned, because the energy will be spread and the aerial of reader
will not detect it. The usability is increased by special or hard housing in industrial
applications. This method can increase the costs too. So the industrial hard tags
are used identification of valuable objects . Typically these tags are used in LF
152 T. Radványi, Cs. Biró, S. Király, P. Szigetváry, P. Takács
(125KHz), HF (13.5MHz), UHF (900MHz) and microwave (2.4GHz). Standards
direct for their distribution. But these might vary from country to country. [1]
2.2. Active tags
Active tags have a independent transmitter with energy source. They can radiate
the stored data continuously. The energy source is usually a battery that could last
for some years. Sometimes the active tags contain an energy harvesting chip, which
collects the energy from the background radiation. These tags use the 433MHz,
2.4GHz and 5.2–5.8GHz frequency. The reading distance can be around 100m.
One or two order of magnitude can be the difference compared to the passive tags.
The UHF passive tag can be read from a distance of 1–3m, but the active tag can
be read from 100m. Their price can be very high, but it can fluctuate depending
on the size of the memory, the life of battery and the kind of their wrapping.
The active tags are appropriated by high-value containers, rail cars. If the tags
are collected and reused at the end of the logistics process, you can save a lot in
termsof cost. [1]
2.3. The RFID operation principle
Those RFID technologies , which use the LF and HF/NFC frequency, are charac-
terized with the small distance reading. Between the tag and the aerial an inductive
coupling builds up. There is a coil-antenna in the antenna of the reader and the
tag. They create together an electro-magnetic field. The tag collects energy from
this common EM field and with the help of it the tag can radiate back the stored
data. Therefore the tag and the aerial of the reader must be near to each other.
That means a couple of inches. These systems are less sensitive to interference
caused by liquid and metal. So the LF and HF/NFC tags can be used better and
more efficiently in these environments.
The passive UHF tags apply the propagation coupling. This coupling uses the
backscatter communication method. Backscattering has important applications in
astronomy, photography and medical ultrasonography. In this way the reader and
the tag don’t constitute a combined EM field. The tag uses the energy emitted by
the reader to radiate back an altered (modulated) wave.
2.4. Fields of application
Application, where we can use RFID technology.
• Access Control Systems
• Identification of people and animals
• Identification of things
• Products, tracking vehicles
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We can use it in toll systems, because it is fast, reliable and we can write back
to the memory of the tag a timestamp or validating data. This technology can
be well used in the following important cases: for retail sale, for the library and
timing sport events. It is in the e-passport too. It is frequently used and very
necessary while travelling, but as such, it is at serious risk. It can become the main
target of attacks, primarily cloning attacks. The e-passport to expand requires
additional means of protection or identification capabilities. This can be biometric
identification, for example fingerprint, or retinal scanner.
3. Researching and improving the RFID in order to
increase its efficiency; security or efficiency
Today’s RFID protocols are formed in such a way that optimizing efficiency has
become more highlighted than consumers’ data security. We insist on using so-
called cryptographic protocols to be able to save all the pieces of information in a
trustworthy manner. Our aim is to broaden the tasks and only affect efficiency in
a minimized way.Through this procedure communication with identification could
be made more efficient and safe.
The RFID based identify-and-follow systems used in the retail trade environ-
ment are the living examples of this hidden working principle. However, there are
numerous danger factors regarding this method. We can picture it the way that
the personal tools, used by the consumers, contain invisible microchips. Via them
smooth, discreet checks can be taken through different procedures. As during these
checks data streams and exchanges are going on in the system, outsiders and users
might get others’ personal information. These problems are really important and
require an swift solution as nowadays the protection of personal information is the
top priority during the operation of a computer system. Some experiments have
been done, some of them are used in practice, but sometimes the technology is
unsafe even with them.
Finally, the priority of safe and clear information handling has been accepted
and the importance of efficiency has been overtopped. We also agree with the thesis
that the data security is our top most priority, especially in the case of systems
where privacy is paramount. For example, bank services should rather be slower
but safer, than faster with the possibility of less security.
4. Main attack possibilities
Algorithmic attacks: performed through the transfer channel. We separate active
and passive ways of attacking. The passive method means that the attacker gets
hidden messages by bugging a public channel. Contrary to the passive, during
an active attack the attacker distributes on the channel himself. We can see the
attacks on the figure 1. In this figure we can see some attacks against the RFID
system. You can see the attacks can come from many directions. The attack can
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be aimed at the transponder, the communication channel and at the software and
hardware system. The destruction and detachment are danger factors too, but
they cannot be taken advantage of. [6, 7]
Figure 1: Attacks against the RFID system
4.1. Cloning a tag
If the RFID tag is not protected with encryption and we know its command set,
function, and the memory partitioning, well, it is very easy to copy it or replace
it with a copy. It causes problems if the system does not pay attention to the
persistence of duplicated tags.
There are different complex solutions for storing data on tags. The simplest
one is the read-only tag- it just contains an invariant unique identifier. If the read-
only transponder gets close enough to the reader’s field, it instantly wakes up and
starts to radiate its identifier number. The attacker can easily create a clone which
contains the exact same code. It is not necessary to get in physical touch with the
transponder, we only need a reader which is able to read the identifier and write it
to another. In more serious and complicated systems, where security is paramount
we should avoid using read-only transponders and insecure data storage.
When working with more complex systems we should avoid using read-only
transponders and unencrypted data storage. By default the transfer medium, in
this case radio waves, transfer the data without encryption. Reading is not recorded
on the transponder, so readings can be repeated without authorization.
Of course the transfer channel might be encrypted with the well-known encryp-
tion methods (DES, block encryption, RSA). Due to the small data quantity the
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transponder is able to store the key is usually small, so in case someone has the
required amount of information the key can be decoded.
4.2. The Malware
Malware is malicious software, and its aim is to break and interfere with computer
systems. RFID malware is a malware spreading through RFID tags.
A totally different type of threat comes to life when hackers and criminals
make RFID tags work unexpectedly and maliciously. Through the queries of the
computer-connected or the mobile readers hackers do it for the RFID tags’ unique
identifier, or for the data stored on the tag, which is usually the key for the database,
or evokes a real action.
Until now everybody who works on RFID technology, silently claimed that read-
ing the RFID tag cannot modify the background software, especially in a harmful
way. Unfortunately they all were wrong. During a research it was proven that the
RFID software has a weak point. A tag intentionally can be infected with a virus
and the virus is able to infect the background database the RFID software uses.
After that the virus can easily spread to other RFID tags.
For example: The perpetrator only needs to purchase a cheap item from the
supermarket, which has a tag attached. After paying for the good he goes home
and cuts off or destroys the tag. Then he puts an infectious tag on the product.
Goes back to the supermarket, to the cash desk, and pays for the item again. But
when the tag is scanned it infects the supermarket’s product database, potentially
inflicting any kind of damage, like changing the prices. But it means a far higher
risk at airports. The virus might help drug smugglers or terrorists hide their
packages. Furthermore, the infected database and luggage can infect other airports’
databases as well. As a result of the virus packages might get to entirely different
destinations than they ought to.
By this time the general structure of the problem has become clear. When
an unsuspicious reader scans an infected tag, there is a risk that the tag takes
advantage of a vulnerability in the middleware to evoke unwanted actions, like
infecting the database. [10]
Classes of RFID malware:
1. The RFID exploit is a malicious tag data, using the parts of the RFID system
it gets in touch with. RFID systems are as sensitive to hacker attacks as
traditional computer systems. When a reader reads an RFID tag, it expects
to get some information in a given format. However, someone can write a
piece of data, the format and content of which are both so unexpected that it
can influence the software, or potentially, the database of the RFID reader,
too.
2. The RFID worm is an RFID-based exploit, taking advantage of the network
connection to gain the ability of self-replication. RFID worms multiply by
using the online RFID services, but they are able to spread themselves on
tags as well. RFID worms make the unsuspicious RFID servers download
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and out some files and carry out the instructions in them. This file aims to
compromise the RFID middleware server the way most of the internet-based
malwares do. The worm-infected RFID software is able to infect other RFID
tags by overwriting their pieces of data with a replication of the RFID worm
code.
3. The RFID virus is such an RFID-based exploit that replicates its code by itself
to other tags without network access. RFID viruses might have contents that
can interfere with or modify the RFID system’s work in the background. As
a freshly infected enters the world it infects other RFID systems (provided
they use a common software system). Then these RFID systems infect other
RFID tags, which infect other RFID software systems and so on.
4.3. Attack through the RF interface
Other types of attacks against RFID systems come through the RF interface. RFID
systems communicate with the help of radio systems and electromagnetic waves
both over short and long distance. This way the attacker has a chance to attack
the RFID system through the radio frequency interface, as there is no need to
get into physical connection with the reader or the transponder. One type of this
attack is well known, so in the following paragraph We would like to explain it.
4.4. Eavesdropping
All kinds of wireless communications can be eavesdropped on a device which re-
strictive is made up of RFID technology. The attacker does not need energy and
physical contact with the reader and the tag. Consequently, the attack can be per-
formed from longer distances. The attacker has to catch the transmitted signals
before the system stores it.
Eavesdropping occurs between the reader and the transponder. The effective
range of the RFID systems vary between a few centimetres (e.g.: 13,56MHz) to
more meters (e.g.: 868MHz). A radio’s antenna requires a far smaller output
voltage to get usable signals, so communication can be eavesdropped from a large
distance.
Finke and Kelter have appointed that the 13.56MHz inductively charged system
can be eavesdropped from 3 meters. The receiver can sense the reader’s motionless
signals from hundreds of meters on a few kHz range. From a greater distance the
signal might be disturbed by metal objects like fences, aluminium objects, or huge
buildings. [14]
What does the success of eavesdropping our devices (reader and transponder)
depend on? The number of influential factors is high.
• Depends on the characteristics of the RF space. This defines the geometry,
structure and output power of the antenna.
• Interfering object between the reader and transponder and the size and loca-
tion of metal objects are also an important factor.
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• It is influenced by the quality, structure and geometry of the attacker’s device,
and also depends on the power emitted by the reader.
• It is also an important factor that passive or active transponders are used
in the RF communication. If the tag is passive, it uses the power generated
by the reader, this way the reflected useful information participates in the
communication with lower energy usage. In the case of UHF tags (868MHz
– 915MHz) 1–3 meter. If the tag is active or semi-passive so it has its own
power source this range can be increased up to 10–30 meters. In case of active
tags the emitted information is easier to catch due to its energy and easier
to hide in larger attack areas. The at-tack area is a space where the attacker
sets his eavesdropping device until he can perform a successful attack.
The following attacks may occur during eavesdropping:
• Secret or personal data may get into unauthorized hands. In this case the
attack does not effect the communication, and it is almost impossible to detect
the attack. Using cryptographic protocols may help defending the data.
• The attacker modifies the eavesdropped data and the false information is
transmitted to the reader. This act requires a specific device and it is really
hard to perform.
• Another possibility is that the attacker does not modify the data but replaces
it. This could happen when the transponder sends a lot of information to
the reader, so the communication requires much more time. In these cases
of eavesdropping the attacker may get detected and his data blocked. Using
control data, cryptographic algorithms and combinations of protocols may
help detecting the attacker.
• The “relay attack” is a much more complicated type of eavesdropping and
it also requires serious technical preparation. In this case the attacker does
not only gather data but also transmits it on another channel. eg.: WIFI
-– longer range. In the other place the data could get processed by an-other
device eg.: during a purchase. This attack is really hard to block due to
the properties of contactless payment methods. For the time being combined
with other identifying methods it provides a good possibility. The simplest
way is using a pin code but any personal or stationary biometric identification
can be used. [15, 16]
It is clear that eavesdropping can be performed really easily sometimes. It holds a
lot of possibilities for the attacker and it is really hard to detect and block. In order
to protect data, if we can not secure the communication channel, we should make
the information difficult to process in case of an attack. Cryptographic protocols
provide data protection during in-formation exchange.
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5. Cryptographic protocols - can be used?
Creating security in low-cost RFID systems is very difficult. Due to limited re-
sources, strong ciphers are difficult or sometimes impossible to implement, so ex-
tremely simple algorithms and protocols need to be designed that take into account
the limitations of passive systems. [8, 9, 11]
CrySys (Laboratory of Cryptography and Systems Security) recommends the
XOR, and RSA.
The basic concept of development started out of the following:
R→ T : x⊕ k = a
T → R : f(x)⊕ k = b
I(h, k) = H(x⊕ f(x))
where the
H(x⊕ f(x)) entropy of the x⊕ f(x)
5.1. The XOR protocol
The structure of the XOR protocol is similar to the previous example, but it uses
different keys in different directions. One option to achieve this the XOR key
generation, where R randomly chooses a new k (i) , does XOR encryption, and
performs k (i-1) key. We get the following protocol:
R→ T : x⊕ k1 = a
T → R : f(x)⊕ k2 = b
We need a secure key-updating scheme.
R→ T : a(i) = x(i) ⊕ k(i), k(i) ⊕ k(i+1)
T → R : b(i) = x(i) ⊕ k(i)
where i = 2, 3, . . . a counter, which is increased in every run, x(i) the i-th
random numeric and k(0) and k(1) shared keys are pre-set . k(1), k(2), . . . sequence
does not change randomly, but the attacker cannot follow their value.
5.2. Other possibilities for defeating attacks
RFID systems are under different types of attacks.In several of these cases we need
to protect the tag itself, but in other cases we have to inhibit the tag from being
read and modified. In some countries where the e-passports are in use no copy-
protection is provided for the users. We can prohibit cloning or attach-connected
attacks with second level identification like a PIN code or biometric identification.
Communication attacks are relatively easy to defeat with cryptographic methods
as the messages can be encrypted with different algorithms.
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6. Authentication
6.1. Legitimation based on derived keys
The main disadvantage of the legitimation mentioned above is that every transpon-
der uses the same k encryption key. This feature means a potential danger factor
for every similar application- which uses a very large number of transponders. Tak-
ing into consideration the fact that these transponders are available for everyone
we have to consider the possibility of the key getting compromised. In this case the
procedure becomes totally useless. To provide it, every transponder gets a unique
key, increasing their security this way.
6.2. Encrypted data connection
We expand the previous situation with a potential attacker. Here the attackers can
be divided into two groups. The first –Attacker1- tries to stay in the background
and get useful information from the data store by eavesdropping and other passive
methods. On the other hand Attacker2 actively takes part in the communication
and modifies its content for his (or for someone else’s) good. The cryptographic
methods provide a solution against both attackers. The data which needs to be
transferred (plain text) is encrypted so the attacker will not be able to reveal its
original content. Random number generation is possible in such small sizes as the
chip.Taking advantage of this, it is possible to expand cheap passive tags in order
to implement the above mentioned encryption algorithms. [18]
6.3. Hash based access control
In case of the cheap smart labels it is necessary to provide a simple security
scheme based on simple hash functions. The implementation of the algorithm
is implemented in hardware. With this method the tags operating in closed and
opened state are separating small slices from the memory in order to store so called
metaIDs. The algorithms are relatively simple. The hash functions need to be im-
plemented in the transponders. The scheme is flexible so it can be extended by
multiple access or write authorizations. The meta-IDs are simple to query in this
way the background database provides an easy building opportunity to third-party
manufacturers. Furthermore the uniqueness of the meta-IDs may provide an easy
identification.
6.4. Asymmetric key checking
Finally among the encryption methods the asymmetric key checking method needs
to be emphasized. In this method when a reader wants to send data to a selected
transponder (the message is v) it is enough for the tag generates a r random number
during the transfer of listening-sensitive data and then sends it back to the reader.
From this value the reader calculates the v⊕r then sends it to the tag. The listener
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who is out of the range of the backward channel just hears this v⊕r and he cannot
conclude to value of the original v. [5]
Against eavesdropping we should detail and confirm the processes mentioned:
• The reader transmits a request to the tag.
• The tag identifies itself to the reader.
We try to force the defense to the communication between the tag and the
reader, assuming that the inner data transmission between the reader and the
background server is al-ready safe.
Of course the following protocol highly depends on the use of active or passive
tags in the communication. The existing requirements are already different and
the available computing capacity also shows a huge difference. Take a look at the
communication scheme on figure 2.
Figure 2: Reader and transponder communication
As shown we use a XOR function in the encryption which can be easily imple-
mented on hardware level, so there is no difficulty in using it in passive tags. The
XOR protocol uses different keys in different directions.
Also an S function appears which requires a little detail. First, consider the
so-called P and S boxes. These are the basis of cryptographic algorithms. Their
advantage is that they are easy to implement electro-technically. This way they
can be integrated to the passive tag’s limited set of tools. In case of active tags this
is not a problem, because the tag contains intelligence, a programmable processor
so the whole AES algorithm is feasible at a relatively low energy input and short
time.
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In case of passive tags we use the combination of P and S boxes. The P box
is a function that creates an 8 bit output from and 8 bit input. A fast and simple
electro-technical de-vice, and it’s inverse function can be easily generated if we
know the P box’s assignment rule. It is responsible for mixing the 8 bit and a
creating a bit permutation.
Figure 3: A possible P box
The S box is a device that implements a nonlinear function which creates 4 bit
output from 6 bit input. [17] The operation of the S box is described by a table
of 4 rows and 16 columns. Each S box has a different table. These tables allow
us to encode the S box. Out of the incoming 6 bits the 1st and 6th gives the row
indexes, while the other 4s decimal equivalent gives the column indexes. This way
we get the 4 output bits based on the table cells.
Figure 4: A possible S box
Shows the S function, which generates the memory content of the user S(data),
and transmits it to the reader. This is a complex function that contains S and P
boxes. As we know the used tables of S and P boxes.
S−1(S(data)) = data
Based on this we get back the data stored in the tags. The use of S and P
boxes is defined by the reader’s key. The reader is a specific computer which
has the computing and storage capacity that is required for generating keys and
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decrypting S(data). The tags are the electronic realizations of S and P boxes.
For data control we create a digest from the stored data. The well-known HASH
functions are suitable for solving this problem. We implement one of the HASH
functions in the tags, eg.: SHA1 function. Using this method we are able to check
the data after decrypting. This provides extra defense against data modifying, or
data insertion attacks.
7. Conclusion
A product is exposed to many dangers during the way from the manufacturer to
the costumer. From the factory it goes to a temporary storage, from there to a
wholesale storage, from there to a retail distribution centre and finally the shelves
of the supermarkets. This is a long process; during this the products can be lost,
accidentally interchanged or stolen. EU regulations are pushing the responsibility
of the manufacturer further and further so the traceability is becoming more and
more important which can be implemented by RFID technology completely. Dur-
ing the production the way of the product is traceable, the technological orders,
work phases and persons who took part in production or any other data. Use of
RFID systems are changing nowadays. Many new technology are coming out, man-
ufacturers and multinational companies are to carry these technologies to the users.
Transponders come out from factories day by day cheaper and smaller; this helps
their spread. Thanks to them being widespread, these systems can be found in
more and more segments, so their vulnerability has to be considered scrutinously.
Nowadays in Hungary reconciliation is in progress about mobile payment possi-
bilities. Their spread might be a milestone for development. The users are not
aware of the dangers of these. Most of them cannot or does not want to deal with
this problem. So the manufacturers have to pay attention to the security, consider
those possibilities that can cause any defect or data theft in systems surrounding
users. Due to the decreasing production costs the data storage limit specific to
cheap passive RFID systems is becoming irrelevant sooner or later. A move is in
progress to active labels which can be used with more security and we don’t have
to create special algorithms in order to work on simple systems.
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